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ARGUMENTS
I.

PLAINTIFF PRESERVED HIS OBJECTION TO INSTRUCTION NO, 19
Defendant

Phillips

concedes

that

Plaintiff

requested

an

instruction based on Canfield v. Albertson's, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224
(Utah App. 1992) (Appellee brief at 5) . Defendant is incorrect that
Plaintiff

dropped

(or

appeared

to

drop)

that

request

for

instruction. Mr. Jensen actually objected to Instruction No. 19 on
two bases:
MR. COOK: Your Honor, this, and in another instruction I will
refer to, the Court has used these instructions, neither of
which were propounded by counsel regarding business invitee.
The business invitee distinction has been abolished in Utah by
higher courts, it rather is a comparative standard that is now
used.
Additionally, Instruction 19 states that if the owner has
knowledge of such danger, et cetera -- well, under Canfield
when evidence is presented or the theory of the case is that
the owner took reasonable precautions for expectable acts of
third parties would create a dangerous condition, actual
knowledge is not required, and we have a copy of Canfield
stating that actual knowledge is not required, it is presumed.
In this case, we had expectable acts of third parties and
conditions created by the defendant...Actual knowledge is not
required.
[Emphasis added].
Transcript at 108-109, included in Appendix H.
Thus, it is clear from the record that Instruction 19 was
objected to by Mr. Jensen on two bases:

The business invitee

distinction and, secondly, the actual knowledge issue.
Phillips

is

clearly

not

correct

in

arguing

that

"reasonable care was the only relevant consideration" and that Mr.
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Jensen

"voiced

no

objection

to

the

foregoing"

instruction.

(Appellee Brief at 7 ) . This ignores the entire colloquy on pages
108-112 of the transcript, as noted above and also set out in
Appendix A to this brief.
Utah law requires that "an objection to an instruction must be
sufficient and precise to alert the trial court to all claimed
error and to give the judge an opportunity to make any corrections
deemed necessary."

Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hospital, 830 P.2d

270, 271 (Utah 1992) .

Clearly, given the discussion in which Mr.

Jensen repeatedly objected to the actual notice requirement, the
trial court was aware that Mr. Jensen wished a Canfield instruction
regarding knowledge.

This is the same argument made on appeal.

Indeed, Phillips admits on page 7 of its brief that:
Plaintiff countered with an instruction based on Canfield v.
Albertson' s, Inc. , 841 P. 2d at 1226, dispensing with the
notice requirement in cases where the "store owner, its
agents, or employees create or are responsible for the
dangerous condition."
The trial court refused to give the
defendant's notice instruction.
For Phillips to argue that the objection was not preserved
belies the transcript in the trial court and its own appellate
brief.
II.

BECAUSE DEFENDANT ARGUED NOTICE A CANFIELD
INSTRUCTION WAS NECESSARY

Phillips states that the trial court "viewed this as a case
where the property owner could not possibly contest notice, since
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it was the one who created the hazardous condition (assuming there
was one).

The trial court's decision not to give the notice

instruction is not at issue."

Appellee's brief at 10.

Mr. Jensen begs to differ.
Phillips

employee

on duty,

Defense counsel argued that the

Paul Hatch, had

no notice

of

the

problem.

(T. 124, line 6-12):

There
because he
report the
know about

is nothing for Paul [Hatch] to do in this situation
didn't know there was a problem. . . . [Mr. Jensen] didn't
situation. ...How can we correct something if we didn't
it?

The purpose of Canfield was to remove this requirement of
knowledge

argued

by

defense

counsel,

i.e.,

"to

relieve

the

Plaintiff of the requirement of proving actual or constructive
notice in such instances as to effect more equatable balance in
regard

to the burdens of proof."

Canfield at 227

(Citations

omitted).
This case is no different from Canfield.
Regarding Canfield v. Albertson's, Phillips notes in its brief
that "Albertson's attempted to defend by arguing that it had no
notice of the specific lettuce leaf upon which plaintiff slipped
and fell."

Appellant brief at 11. This is precisely what occurred

in this case:

Phillips attempted to argue that it had no notice of

the conditions upon which plaintiff slipped and fell.

(T.124, line

6-12) .
In its brief, Phillips states "Plaintiff agrees that the trial
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court's instruction on reasonable care was correct..."
brief 11) . This is not true.
one of reasonable care.
correct.

(Appellee's

Jensen agreed that the standard was

He did not agree that the instruction was

As admitted by Phillips in its brief

(page 7 ) ,

Mr.

Jensen asked for a Canfield instruction on the issue of knowledge.
Thus,

Phillips'

implication

that

plaintiff

wanted

only

the

reasonable care instruction is contradicted by its own brief and
the transcript at 108-109.
III.

FAILURE TO GIVE THE INSTRUCTION WAS HARMFUL ERROR BECAUSE
DEFENSE COUNSEL ARGUED NOTICE AND KNOWLEDGE
Jensen alleges that the "jury was never told that notice was

an issue." (Appellants brief at 11). This is not true.

Phillips

repeatedly argued notice in this situation:
There was nothing for Paul [Hatch] to do in this situation
because he didn't feel there was a problem.
...We didn't
know. How can we correct something if we didn't know about
it?
(T. 124, line 6-12).
For Phillips to state that notice was not argued at the trial
level is incorrect.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURTS AWARD OF COSTS IN EXCESS OF THAT ALLOWED
BY STATUTE WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Phillips seeks to be paid for the deposition "appearance fee"

paid to the expert witness.

However, as noted in Frampton v.

Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980), where the expert witnesses were
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also paid in excess of the subpoena rate:
There is a distinction to be understood between
legitimate and taxable "costs" and other "expenses," of
litigation which may be ever so necessary, but are not
properly taxable as costs.
Consistent with that
distinction, the courts hold that expert witnesses cannot
be awarded extra compensation unless the statute
expressly provides.
Frampton at 774.
No statute authorizes this expense for the expert witness to
be included in the judgment.

While URCP 26(b)(4)(C) allows a

reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery, Phillips
has failed to note any statute which authorizes this fee to be
included in the taxable costs. The "Utah Supreme Court has defined
costs to mean those fees which are required to be paid to the court
and to witnesses, AND for which the statutes authorize
included

in

the

(emphasis added).

judgment."

Morgan,

citing

It is a two part test:

Frampton,

to be
at

774

Not only must the fees

be required, but the statute must authorize them to be included in
the judgment.

The statute does not authorize Dr. Paulos' expert

fee to be included in the judgment.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff preserved his objection to Instruction No. 19 in his
request for a Canfield instruction. Any error was not harmless, as
notice was an issue and argued by Phillips. The trial court abused
its discretion in awarding the deposition appearance fee inasmuch
as no statute authorizes payment of that fee.
7

DATED this

f

day of September, 1994.

GLEN A. COOK
COOK & LAWRENCE, L.L.C.
Attorneys for Appellant
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Mr. Cook, have you had occasion to look at those?
MR. COOK:

I have, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Have you, Mr. Dal ton?

MR. DALTON:

I have, your Honor.

THE COURT:

The procedure that we'll follow, I

have numbered the proposed jury instructions.

The first

thing we would like to talk about is the exceptions to those
instructions, and I would like you to do that by referring to
the number and any comments that you have on them, referring
to any case law, Mr. Cook, and then you the same thing,
Mr. Dal ton, and then we will talk about exceptions to the
Court's failure to give your proposed jury instructions.

So

let's start with you, Mr. Cook.
MR. COOK:

Thank you, your Honor.

Can we turn to

Instruction No. 19?
THE COURT:
MR. COOK:

All right.
Your Honor, this, and in another

instruction I will refer to, the Court has used these
instructions, neither of which were propounded by counsel
regarding business invitee.

The business invitee distinction

has been abolished in Utah by higher courts, it rather is as
a comparative standard that is now used.
Additionally, Instruction 19 states that if the
owner has a knowledge of such danger, et cetera —

well,

under Canfield. when evidence is presented or the theory of

108

THE COURT:

I don't think that's the case, except

in the case of tenant and landlord and that's as far as that
distinction goes.
landlord.

It does not extend beyond tenant and

There is a tenant and landlord case that

essentially distinguishes and abolishes that distinction,
but it does not extend to the business invitees nor does it
extend to the trespassers.
MR. COOK:

Okay.

MR. DALTON:

I would like to speak to 20. In

fact, that is an instruction I requested.

I think that's

required under that Peats vs. Commercial Security Bank
building that I referred to the Court.

So I am happy with 20

and 21.
THE COURT:

I wi11 note your objection.

I will

give you a chance to look and see what you can give me as far
as case law.

If the only case law you have is the one

dealing with landlord and tenant, that I'm not interested in.
MR. COOK:
THE COURT:
MR. COOK:

Okay.
Because it didn't do that.
Instruction No. 27 appears, your

Honor, to be a Biswell instruction, and I note the copies you
gave us are the ones without citations on them.
THE COURT:
MR. COOK:

That's the one out of MUJI.
We would encourage the Court either to

use our Biswell instruction, which actually I thought I had

112

back out, salt that spot right there, take a shovel, break it
up, put it down the drain.
way again, no problem.
didn't do that.
what he's doing.

Five, ten minutes, he is on his

Again, it's not our fault if he

We can't be there every second to watch over
We are not babysitters.

The fact is, he

didn't move the truck, he didn't go for help, and there was
nothing for Paul to do in this situation because he didn't
know there was a problem.

You see, even after Mr. Jensen

injured himself, he didn't go to Paul.
situation.

He didn't report the

He didn't come and tell us, "Look, you have got a

problem over there."

He loaded up, called the dispatcher to

say he was done, went on his way.

We didn't know.

How can we correct something if we didn't know
about it?

It's his responsibility to come tell us if there

is a problem.

Somebody else might encounter it.

You would

think if there had been a big problem, he would have told us,
even after the fact.

Now, that's assuming that there was a

problem, because you have heard testimony from people who
were in that bay that very morning that they didn't even
consider it a problem.

Paul Hatch was one of them.

He stood

in the very place that Mr. Jensen said he slipped and he ran
the manual meter reading on the pump there and he doesn't
remember having a problem.
Now, of course he is there every day or he works
there, but you also heard the proffer, the testimony by
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